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EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES NOT EQUAL RESULTS:




In Kalancke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen,' the European Court of Justice ex-
pressly embraced the philosophy of equality of opportunity over equality of result in
employment. The Court examined a Bremen law which granted preference in public
service appointment to women over equally qualified men when women did not make
up half of the employees in the relevant pay bracket. The Court held that the law
violated the Equal Treatment Directive adopted by the European Council in 1976. In
so finding, the Court stated that "such a system substitutes for equality of opportunity
as envisaged in Article 2(4) [of the directive] the result which is only to be arrived at
by providing such equality of opportunity."2 The Court thus drew a distinction be-
tween equality of opportunity, which is required by the directive, and equality of re-
sult, which is not.
Kalancke's significance to the debate over affirmative action extends well beyond
the boundaries of the European Community. It vindicates equality of opportunity and
highlights the underlying infirmity of so many affirmative action plans: substituting
equal (pre-determined) outcomes for equal (and hence competitive) opportunities.
However, Kalancke predictably raised a storm among advocates of affirmative action
in Europe. Karin Junker, a member of the European Parliament, denounced the deci-
sion as "a macho verdict" from "a court made up solely of men who have never felt
what it is like to be disadvantaged solely on the basis of sex."3 (Affirmative action has
not yet reached the judiciary.) She suggested that half of the judges of the Court be
removed and replaced with women.' This discreditable 'solution' suggested (presum-
ably in jest) by Junker is, as we shall see, compatible with her repudiation of the phi-
losophy of equality of opportunity.
In response to these critics, European Court Judge David A.O. Edwards
emphasised that mandating equality of result denies equality of opportunity and hence
is discriminatory. He asked, "Has the court done any more than say there comes a
* Professor of Law, T. C. Beirne School of Law, The University of Queensland, and Director,
The Australian Institute of Foreign and Comparative Law.
1. Case C-450/93, Kalancke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R.
175 (1996) [Hereafter Kalancke] (All other references are to the C.M.L.R.).
2. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 194 (para. 23) (Judgment of the Court).
3. James Pressley, Sex-Discrimination Case Shows Anomaly in EU Law, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct.
31, 1995, at 4.
4. Id.
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point at which 'positive discrimination' is discrimination?"5 However, the distinction
drawn by the Court between equality of opportunity and equality of result signifies
more than Judge Edward's comment might suggest. Many affirmative action schemes
will be open to legal challenge as automatic preferences after the Kalancke judgment.
The remainder of this article will argue that the European Court of Justice rightly
emphasised that equality of opportunity does not demand equality of result, and that
automatic preferences based on gender are inconsistent with equality of opportunity.
II. DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF EQUALITY
Equality of Opportunity Versus Equality of Result
The affirmative action debate revolves around two basic ideals: equality of op-
portunity and equality of result. Equality of opportunity allows individuals to compete
for employment solely on the basis of characteristics relevant to satisfactory perfor-
mance, and not on the basis of generally extraneous factors such as sex or race. In a
society adhering to this ideal, individuals occupy positions earned exclusively on the
basis of their demonstrated individual talents and skills.' International instruments such
as the European Community ("EC") Equal Treatment Directive and the Multilateral
Human Rights Treaties7 further equal opportunity by stipulating that race and sex are
irrelevant to the satisfactory performance of most jobs. Thus, employees should be
selected without regard to such characteristics, and arbitrary barriers to employment
based on such characteristics should not be set up.
Removing artificial barriers to employment in order to provide equal opportunity
does not necessarily result in proportionate representation of groups in the workforce.
Instead, removing these barriers to employment widens the field to allow classes of
people previously excluded to compete for jobs. This does not, however, guarantee that
the competition will result in proportionate participation. Indeed, the outcome of the
competition becomes less predictable. Talents and skills are not distributed uniformly
throughout the human race such that each market within each geographic area contains
a proportionate number of qualified applicants of each sex and race. Consequently,
implementing equality of opportunity will almost surely result in very different out-
comes in each geographic area and market. Individual differences explain why differ-
ent groups in society are represented in varying degrees (often to a marked extent) in a
certain employment context.8 These outcomes are likely to change over time, more-
over, because social mobility enables people "to move up and down the hierarchy"
according to their own talents and skills.' Such a view of equality is consistent with
individual choice of occupation and education according to the skills and talents of
each individual.
5. Id.
6. See JOHN C. LIVINGSTON, FAIR GAME? INEQUALITY AND AFFIRMATIvE ACTION 18 (1979).
7. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Dec.
14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93; Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation, June 25, 1958, ILO No. 111, 362 U.N.T.S. 31.
8. See also PHILIP DE LACEY AND GABRIEL MOENs, THE DECLINE OF THE UNIVERSITY 138-39
(1990).
9. Charles Frankel, Equality of Opportunity, 81 ETHIcs 191, 203 (1971).
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Equality of result, in contrast, is premised upon the belief that a "nearly random
distribution of women or other minorities in all jobs" would be expected to occur in
the absence of discriminatory practices." Those adhering to this premise, therefore,
wish to legislatively mandate proportionate representation of each group in society
according to its numerical strength." Proponents conclude that any large disparities in
result (or outcome) must necessarily be due to a system or structure of discrimination
which disadvantages a substantially higher proportion of one group more than another.
Some writers go further, arguing that, even if talents and skills are not distributed
uniformly, society must remove the large disparities that result from implementing
equality of opportunity. Because equality of opportunity does not necessarily result in
proportionate representation, these writers, in order to further their "utopian" goal,
demand that race or sex again be a formal basis for appointment to employment.
Thus, the proponents of equality of result promote preferential measures advancing
applicants on the basis of race or sex, such as the measure in Kalancke.
Such a view of equality rejects the consequences arising from free choice of
occupation and education. Its proponents believe that the under-represented's free
choice could not itself account for under-representation. However, as the Advocate-
General observed in Kalancke, "under-representation of women in a given segment of
the employment market ... is not necessarily attributable to a consummate determina-
tion to marginalise women."" Rather, equality of opportunity, and the freedom of
individual choice it protects, lends itself to widely differing outcomes based on individ-
ual choices. In contrast, equality of result aims at pre-determined outcomes and is
ultimately inconsistent with freedom of choice.
Two Forms of Affirmative Action: Two Forms of Equality
Just as there are two ideals of equality, two forms of affirmative action programs
may be distinguished. These forms of affirmative action programs, labeled "soft" and
"hard" affirmative action programs, follow the different ideals of equality. "Soft" affir-
mative action programs are consistent with the ideal of equality of opportunity, where-
as "hard" affirmative action programs conform to the ideal of equality of result.
"Soft" affirmative action programs include measures taken to remove arbitrary
barriers to employment that invidiously discriminate on the basis of race or sex. Such
measures include the publication of statements that the employer is an equal opportuni-
ty employer, improvement of recruiting procedures, information campaigns aimed at
locating suitable minority applicants, and any other specific remedies that enable appli-
cants to compete effectively for scarce employment opportunities. These measures
promote equality of opportunity by removing artificial barriers to employment.
Opening positions through the use of affirmative action measures conforms to
equality of opportunity described above. Justice is achieved when individuals are al-
lowed to compete for valued rewards determined exclusively by characteristics relevant
10. LANCE W. ROBERTS, Understanding Affirmative Action, in DIsCRIMINATION, AFFIRMATIVE AC-
TION, AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 145, 157 (W.E. Block & M.A. Walker eds., 1982).
11. See, e.g., Titia Loenen & Albertine Veldman, Preferential Treatment in the Labour Market
After Kalancke: Some Comparative Perspectives, 12 INT'L J. OF COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 48
(1996) [hereinafter Loenen & Veldman].
12. Jeffrey Rosen, Affirmative Action: A Solution, NEw REPUB., May 8, 1995 at 20.
13. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 189 (para. 24) (Opinion of Advocate-General).
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to the reward. Such programs preserve the right of individuals to be selected solely on
the basis of factors relevant to employment.
In contrast, "hard" affirmative action programs involve the selection and recruit-
ment of minority workers and women precisely on the basis of their race or sex. Such
measures typically involve setting aside a specified proportion of positions to be filled
by persons of a specified race or sex or a requirement that members of one societal
group be preferred over another. They seek to substitute the outcome of equality of
result for the practice of equality of opportunity. In preferring women over equally
qualified men, the Bremen law at issue in Kalancke may be classified as a "hard"
affirmative action program.
Supporters of "hard" affirmative action programs believe that replacing discrimi-
natory practices with legitimate procedures does not accomplish enough. They point
out that "soft" affirmative action programs require a "comparatively long time to pro-
duce a social order free of the marks signifying its discriminatory past." 4 They, con-
sequently, insist that more vigorous affirmative action is needed immediately to rectify
inequities produced by past "societal" discrimination. Those supporting this strain of
affirmative action claim that reparation must be made for past discrimination practiced
by society as a whole. They are not concerned that such reparation may involve dis-
crimination in favour of individuals who belong to preferred groups. This process of
reparation is called redress. Redress is essentially a kind of make-up or revenge pro-
cess, whereby the descendants of those who were inappropriately advantaged in the
past are required to forfeit, disproportionately, opportunities for social benefits in con-
sideration of past sins committed by people of the same sex or race. Taken to its logi-
cal extreme, the notion of redress would give women two votes for a period of time
because their grandmothers had none.
Ill. THE KALANCKE CASE
Equality of Opportunity Versus Equality of Result Comes to European Law
In Kalancke, the European Court of Justice had its first occasion to decide
whether affirmative action comports with the Equal Treatment Directive. 5 At about
the same time that the European Court rendered its decision in Kalancke, American
affirmative action programs were also being reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court. Many commentators viewed the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand Construc-
tors v. Pena"6 as the possible end of racially-based affirmative action in America. As
the Advocate-General 7 told the European Court, "In Europe, positive action has be-
gun to take hold or, at any event, to become the object of attention at the very time
when affirmative action seems to be a state of crisis in its country of origin."'
8
Although this was the first time when the European Court had to rule on the
compatibility of gender preferences with the directive, there were indications in prior
14. ROBERTS, supra note 10, at 151.
15. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 180 (para. 7) (Opinion of Advocate-General).
16. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
17. The Advocates-General give impartial advice to the Court in public session as to how cases
should be decided. GABRIEL MOENS & DAVID FLINT, BusINEss LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNrrY
12.3.1, at 304 (1993). Normally the Advocate-General's Opinion is accorded great weight. Id.
12.3.7 at 306.
18. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 182 n.10 (Opinion of Advocate-General).
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case law that the Court would not be likely to view favourably legislation based upon
the philosophy of enforced equality of result. In De Lauche v. Commission,9 the
Court stated that the Equal Treatment Directive did not permit reverse discrimination.
The Court also held in Commission v. France" that the directive did not permit con-
ferring special rights upon women.
Fact: Mr. Kalancke is Not a Woman
Two candidates applied for the position of section manager in Bremen Parks
Department. One was male, Mr. Kalancke, and the other female, Mrs. Glilmann. Mr.
Kalancke was the section manager's deputy and held a diploma in horticulture and
landscape gardening. He had worked as a horticultural employee since 1973. Mrs.
GliBmann, on the other hand, held qualifications as a horticultural scientist and land-
scape gardener. She had worked as a horticultural employee since 1975. Parks Depart-
ment management supported Mr. Kalancke for the position while the Personnel Com-
mittee opposed his appointment to the post. Because of this disagreement, the appoint-
ment went to arbitration where Mr. Kalancke was favoured once more. However, the
Personnel Committee could not accept this decision, and deeming the arbitration to
have been a failure, requested that the matter be referred to the Conciliation Board.
The Board ruled that both candidates possessed the same qualifications."
Since women constituted less than fifty percent of the employees in the relevant
individual pay bracket of this personnel group within the department, affirmative action
was mandatory under Bremen law. Thus, the finding that both candidates possessed the
same qualifications was instantly fatal to Mr. Kalancke's application. Under the Bre-
men Law on Equal Treatment for Men and Women in the Public Service,22 if women
comprised less than fifty percent of the employees in an individual pay bracket within
the relevant personnel group of a department, priority was to be given to a female
candidate over a male candidate of the "same qualifications."23 That women com-
prised less than fifty percent of employees in any such pay bracket was statutorily
deemed "under-representation," even if women did not comprise fifty percent of the
relevant labour force. Such "under-representation" triggered preferential treatment for
women in cases of equal qualification.
Mr. Kalancke unsuccessfully challenged the law under various provisions of
German law.' However, a German court2 6 referred the matter to the Court of Justice
for a preliminary ruling as to the compatibility of the Bremen law with European law,
as established in the Equal Treatment Directive. 7
19. Case 111/86, De Lauche v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 1-5345, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 565 (1989).
20. Case 312186, Commission v. France, 1988 E.C.R. 6315, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 408 (1989).
21. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 191 (paras. 4-5) (Opinion of the Court), 179 (para. 4) (Opinion of
Advocate-General).
22. Gesetz zur Gleichstellung von Frau und Mann im Offentlichen Dienst des Landes Bremen,
4, Nov. 20, 1990, Bremisches Gesetzblatt 433 (Law on Equal Treatment of Men and Women in the




25. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 179-80 (para. 5) (Opinion of Advocate-General).
26. The Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court).
27. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 180 (para. 6) (Opinion of Advocate-General).
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A European Safeguard of Equality of Opportunity? The Equal Treatment
Directive
The European Court of Justice declared the Bremen law inconsistent with the
Equal Treatment Directive of 1976.2" The Equal Treatment Directive is one of the
directives adopted by the Council to give effect to Article 119 of the EC Treaty.29
Article 119 requires Member States to maintain the "principle that men and women
should receive equal pay for equal work."'  Article 119 is thus "the European
translation"'" of I.L.O. Convention No. 10032 on equal remuneration for men and
women workers for work of equal value.33
Two provisions of the Equal Treatment Directive are central to the Kalancke
judgment. Article 2(1) unqualifiedly prohibits direct and indirect sex discrimination:
"the principle of equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no discrimination what-
soever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to mari-
tal or family status."' Article 2(4) expressly permits discriminatory measures that
promote equality of opportunity, but never allows discrimination mandating equality of
result.33 Article 2(4) thus allows Member States to adopt "measures to promote equal
opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities which
affect women's opportunities in the areas referred to in Article 1()."'6
The Court and the Advocate-General both recognized the discriminatory nature
of the Bremen law. Since it gave automatic preference to women over equally quali-
fied men in employment sectors in which women were "under-represented," it consti-
tuted discrimination based on sex.37 Thus, the law fell foul of Article 2(l)'s general
prohibition against sex discrimination, unless it could be squeezed into the Article 2(4)
exception as a measure promoting equal opportunity.
One for Equality of Opportunity, One for Equality of Result
The British Government and the European Commission intervened in the pro-
ceedings to make submissions to the Court. The British Government supported the
principle of equality of opportunity arguing that the Bremen law was directed not to
equal treatment but to social engineering. It further pointed out that since a multitude
of factors could account for a lack of proportional representation, quota rules are predi-
cated upon an erroneous assumption that unequal representation equates with discrimi-
nation. Appointments must be consistent with the principle of equality of opportunity,
so appointment quotas are impermissible since they subject appointments to the prin-
ciple of equality of result.38
28. Id. at 194 (para. 23) (Judgment of the Court).
29. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 119.
30. Id.
31. Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455, 484, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 98, 110 (1976)
(Opinion of Advocate-General).
32. Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal
Value, June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303.




37. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 193 (para. 16) (Judgment of the Court); id. at 182 (para. 10) (Opin-
ion of Advocate-General).
38. Ursula A. O'Hare, Positive Action Before the European Court of Justice: Case C-450193
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The European Commission intervened in favour of Bremen's version of equality
of result. The Commission argued that Bremen's law was not a strict quota, but a "tie-
break" provision. It argued that if two candidates were "equally qualified" the decision
as to appointment should be made on the basis of gender."
IV. THE KALANCKE DECISION
The Court and the Advocate-General both held that the Bremen law violated
Article 2(1)'s general prohibition against sex discrimination and could not be justified
by falling within the Article 2(4) exception for measures promoting equal opportunity.
Their reasons will be critically examined in the following section.
Opportunity Equality is Equal, Result Equality is Not
Both the Court and the Advocate-General endorsed equality of opportunity over
equality of result. In a significant passage, the Court said that "in so far as it seeks to
achieve equal representation of men and women in all grades and levels within a de-
partment, [the Bremen] system substitutes, for the equality of opportunity envisaged in
Article 2(4), the result which is only to be arrived at by providing such equality of
opportunity." Hence, the discriminatory approach of the Bremen law violated Article
2(1) and was not saved by Article 2(4).
One writer demurs that "[t]he approach of the Court illustrates its underlying
assumption that all discrimination on grounds of sex is to be treated the same," wheth-
er it be invidious or "benign."' 1 The Court's assumption is logical because the direc-
tive itself, in its prohibition of sex discrimination (Article 2(1)), does not differentiate
between (invidious) discrimination against women and (benign) discrimination against
men.
The Advocate-General also endorsed the concept of equality of opportunity. He
condemned "measures not in fact designed to remove the obstacles preventing women
from pursuing the same results on equal terms, but to confer the results on them di-
rectly."42 He defines "equal opportunities" in Article 2(4) as "equality with respect to
starting points" (equality of opportunity) not "with respect to points of arrival" (equali-
ty of result). Measures to "promote equal opportunities" were those eliminating barriers
in the way of "equality with respect to starting points."' 3 The Advocate-General was
no more impressed with the Bremen law at issue than was the Court. This law was not
designed to eliminate barriers impeding "equality with respect to starting points" but
sought to create equality "with respect to points of arrival." Hence, it overstepped the
limits of the derogation.'
Kalancke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 2 WEB J. oF CuRRENT LEGAL IssuEs (March 24, 1996)
<http://www.ncl.ac.ukl-nlawwww/1996/issue2/ohare2.html> (hereinafter O'Hare).
39. Id. (Intervention of the Commission).
40. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 194 (para. 23) (Judgment of the Court).
41. S. Moore, Nothing Positive From the Court of Justice, 21 EUROPEAN L. REv. 156, 159
(1996). Contrast Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119-20 (Thomas, J., concuning in part and concurring in the
judgment).
42. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 188 (para. 22) (Opinion of Advocate-General).
43. Id. at 183 (para. 13).
44. Id. at 183-84 (para. 13).
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Non-discrimination and Individual Rights
Both the Advocate-General and the Court viewed the right to non-discrimination
on the ground of sex as an individual right.45 This should be uncontroversial. The
Court draws a conclusion from this, however, which goes to the dispute between the
supporters and foes of equality of opportunity.' Because non-discrimination on the
basis of sex is an individual right -- a fundamental right in the Court's case law47 --
the Court ruled that the derogation in Article 2(4) from the principle of non-discrimi-
nation had to be interpreted strictly.48
Proponents of preferences cannot contend that the derogation in Article 2(4) is
itself an individual right, simply because the provision is not structured in that way.
The individual right of non-discrimination appears in Article 2(1), but the derogation
limiting that right appears in Article 2(4). While Article 2(4) is a derogation from an
individual right, Article 2(1) is clearly an individual right. A derogation from a funda-
mental right reduces the scope and content of that right. Consequently, in order to
preserve fundamental rights to their fullest, a derogation must be interpreted strictly.
Relatively little attention is paid to the text of Article 2(4) by supporters of pref-
erential treatment. The language of the provision itself is inconsistent with the concept
of equality of result. Any interpretation of the derogation in Article 2(4) must take into
account its express emphasis upon equal opportunity not upon equal result. Nowhere
does the provision mention numerical enhancement of women's occupational represen-
tation or even proportional representation. Instead, the provision speaks of "removing
existing inequalities which affect women's opportunities ... to promote equal opportu-
nity."49 Thus, the provision is not directed to result. Rather, it is oriented towards op-
portunity.
The wider a derogation from an individual right is interpreted, the less significant
that right becomes. Of all the rights in law that should be safeguarded from being
undermined by judicial interpretation, the principle of non-discrimination must surely
be paramount. Preferences of any sort open a gaping hole in the principle of non-dis-
crimination.
"Absolute and Unconditional" Preferences
The Court ruled that laws "which guarantee women absolute and unconditional
priority for appointment or promotion go beyond promoting equal opportunities" and
thus could not be saved by Article 2(4).5o The use of the term "absolute and uncondi-
tional priority" is one of the most problematic aspects of the judgment because of its
ambiguity. Perhaps the Court means that a law which contains any preference based on
45. Id. at 194 (para. 21) (Judgment of the Court); id. at 180 (para. 7) (Opinion of Advocate-
General).
46. Loenen & Veldman, supra note 11, at 50-52.
47. Case 149/77, Defrenne (No. 2) v. Sabena, 1978 E.C.R. 1365, 3 C.M.L.R. 312, 329 (para. 27)
(1978) (Judgment of the Court); Case T-45/90, Speybrouk v. European Parliament, 1992 E.C.R. 11-33
(para. 47).
48. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 194 (para. 21) (Judgment of the Court), citing Case 222/84, Johnston
v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986 E.C.R. 1651, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 240 (par.
36) (1986).
49. Id.
50. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 194 (para. 22) (Judgment of the Court).
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sex is inconsistent with the directive. Such a holding would be the most comprehensive
way in which the Court could adopt equality of opportunity. Nonetheless, it is at least
clear that preferential laws that offer "absolute and unconditional priority" violate the
directive. Unfortunately, the Court does not explain what constitutes an "absolute and
unconditional priority," nor does it indicate why the Bremen law was "absolute and
unconditional." The facts of the case must be closely scrutinized to gain some insight
into the factors which caused the Court to so characterize the Bremen law.
Some suggest that the Bremen law was not "unconditional" because conditions
were placed upon the granting of preference: "under-representation" (as defined) and
"equal qualification."'" It is probable that the Court's use of the words "absolute and
unconditional" follows from the Bremen law's automatic ("absolute and uncondi-
tional") preference in the specified circumstances and not from preconditions to auto-
matic priority.
Two possible explanations of "automatic priority" have been identified. Accord-
ing to the first explanation, priority for women in cases of "equal qualification" is
"automatic priority." This was the view of the Advocate-General, who considered that
such a practice is directed only to result and not opportunity.52 This view is the more
plausible of the two.
Others criticize this approach. They point out that the Court has already refused
to grant special rights for women." If women are not either allowed automatic ap-
pointment when equally qualified, "no feasible measures [remain to be] covered by
Article 2 para. 4."' This criticism is not accurate. "Soft" affirmative action measures
fall within the exception of Article 2(4) because they are consistent with the directive's
aim of promoting equality of opportunity. Denying the feasibility of such measures is
consistent only with a preoccupation with result rather than equal opportunity. So-
called "feasible" measures are likely to be "hard" affirmative action measures. Such
measures do not secure (and are inconsistent with) equality of opportunity but seek to
secure an equality of result. They are not saved by the exception in Article 2(4) and
fail under the general prohibition of discrimination in Article 2(1).
The second possible interpretation of "automatic priority" is the less likely expla-
nation of the decision, and it is one that robs the decision of much of its force. This
explanation offers that the Court did not condemn priority for women in cases of
"equal qualification." Rather, the Court condemned the particular characteristics of the
Bremen scheme that caused it to constitute automatic priority. The argument maintains
that the Bremen scheme constituted "automatic priority" because the preference contin-
ued to operate even when women did make up fifty percent of the relevant labour
market. This was "considered too blunt an instrument by the Court."55
Supporters of this position, however, do not explain how the proportion of wom-
en in the relevant labour market ties in with the Court's language: "automatic priority"
or "absolute and unconditional." That pre-condition goes to proportionality rather than
to the automatic nature of the preference.
Furthermore, if priority for women in cases of "equal qualification" is not "auto-
51. Loenen & Veldman, supra note 11, at 46.
52. Id. at 47.
53. Case 312/86, Conunission v. France, 1988 E.C.R. 6315, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 408 (1988).




matic priority," why did the Court not proceed to the second step and examine the
proportionality of the national measure to the objective sought to be achieved? If prior-
ity for women in cases of "equal qualification" were not "automatic priority," the
Court would have to decide the question of proportionality. That it did not do so
strongly suggests that "automatic priority" for women meant (perhaps inter alia) priori-
ty for women in cases of "equal qualification."
How Equal is "Equally Qualified"?
The criteria "equally qualified" adopted by the Bremen law is somewhat mystify-
ing. How will two candidates ever be truly "equally qualified" for the job? Rarely
indeed will two people be identical in every possible criteria that might have any rele-
vance for the job. More likely, a hiring committee would settle for a finding of "equal-
ly qualified" rather than more rigorously scrutinizing which candidate has better quali-
fications for the job. It operates as an excuse for preference to operate.
Likely, considerable pressure would lead a hiring authority to deem candidates
"equally qualified" thus creating an excuse for preferential treatment. The very fact
that the two candidates in this case were deemed "equally qualified" despite two prior
recommendations for Mr. Kalancke's appointment suggests that the phrase "equally
qualified" merely acts as a veil for discrimination. Superior qualifications possessed by
a male employee would not be thought inconsistent with the "equal qualification" of a
female employee.
Commentators have suggested that when candidates are "equally qualified," the
choice could only be made on the basis of sex. In such a situation, the only alternative
to female appointment is male appointment, a more invidious form of sex discrimina-
tion. These commentators suggest flipping a coin is the only way not to discriminate.
"We think it safe to say that the Court cannot have intended that its decision would
subject application procedures to such a community law requirement."56
It is safe to conclude that the Court meant no such thing. This scenario ignores
that, instead of the Personnel Committee's supine insistence that the candidates pos-
sessed equal qualifications, thus activating the gender preference, they should have
more rigorously scrutinized the candidates' suitability for the position. A more exacting
study of each applicant's suitability would almost certainly have revealed one to be
more suitable than the other. Thus, there would have been no justification for a gender
preference for either applicant, and the more suitable applicant would have been ap-
pointed. The Bremen authorities did not have to flip a coin.
Blunt Instrument Social Engineering and Proportionality
Even if the directive had been held to authorize preferences based on sex, the
preference in issue would have failed the proportionality test by which "the national
measure in question must not exceed that which is appropriate and necessary to
achieve the intended aim."57 Because granting automatic preferences based on sex
was not authorized by the directive, the Court did not consider the proportionality test.
Had it needed to do so, the Bremen law would surely have been thought disproportion-
ate relative to any objective, short of compelling equal representation of men and
56. Id. at 48.
57. Kalancke, I C.M.L.R. at 188 (para. 23) (Opinion of Advocate-General).
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women in all occupations.
The Bremen law was a particularly outrageous form of discrimination because of
its definition of "under-representation." The law required that preferences be given to
women unless they made up one half of the employees in a particular pay bracket,
even if women did represent less (even much less) than one half of the labour force
from which employees could be chosen. Thus, even if women represented only five
per cent of the relevant labour market, the employer had to continue to give preference
in the defined circumstances until women made up fifty percent of employees of the
relevant pay bracket. This is an especially blunt instrument of social engineering"8
based on the idea that proportional representation should exist in every occupation,
even if women have not chosen to pursue that occupation in numbers approaching
those of men.
The Bremen law may be explained only by drawing a presumption of discrimina-
tion in situations of "under-representation." It is often argued that the statistical "under-
representation" of women in certain categories of occupation is a prima facie indicator,
raising a presumption of discrimination. The prima facie presumption of discrimination
is based on belief that "under-representation" must be the consequence of discrimina-
tory causes rather than the consequence of individual decisions as to career path, edu-
cation, marriage," and a multitude of other voluntary factors which can make a ma-
jor, even dramatic, difference to occupational patterns.'
The argument assumes that each sex must contain an equal proportion of mem-
bers as the other, interested in every line of work. If so, "under-representation" proves
discrimination. The prima facie presumption is entertained by people who cannot be-
lieve that "under-representation" may be the consequence of free choices made by
members of the under-represented group.
Fixation with equality of result leads to a line of thought inconsistent with free-
dom of choice. Because people are not all the same, free choice of employment is
likely to lead to different choices by the individuals who make up groups. Proportional
representation will never be achieved within each occupational group if freedom of
choice is maintained.
The Inequality of Equality: the Different Standards for Sex and Race-Based
Affirmative Action in Europe and America
European Community law provides no specific legislation prohibiting racial
discrimination, 1 although it has passed specific legislation forbidding sex discrimina-
tion.' In America, however, sex discrimination is subject to less exacting constitu-
58. Such a scheme would not be upheld in the United States. Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
480 U.S. 616 (1987); Nancy L. Perkins, Judgment of the Court in Eckhard Kalancke v. Freie
Hansestadt Breman, 35 INT'L LEGAL MATERALS (Am. Soc. Int'l Law) 265-66 (Mar. 1996).
59. See THoMAs SOWELL, Civo RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY 98 (1984).
60. The presumption that under-representation is a prima facie indicator of discrimination also im-
plies that proportional representation (or full utilisation) is a prima facie indicator of the absence of
discrimination. A preference scheme consistent with equality of result that achieves proportional repre-
sentation at the expense of equality of opportunity shows that this is not necessarily the case.
61. But see Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle fUr Getreide
und Futtermittel 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1972 C.M.L.R. 255 and Art. F(2); Treaty on European Union, Feb.
7, 1992, art. F, para. 2, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 5.




tional review than is racial discrimination.63 It has been observed that the recent deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice have led
to an anomalous situation. In Europe, racially-based affirmative action is easier for
governments to practice than sex-based affirmative action. But in the United States,
sex-based affirmative action is easier for governments to practice than racially-based
affirmative action.' This is indeed an anomaly and cannot be justified. This article
proposes, as a solution, to abolish all affirmative action measures (whether based on
sex or race) incompatible with the principle of equality of opportunity.
The Insignificance of Incompatible European Parliament Interpretation and
National Practice Before Judgment
The European Parliament and a number of Member States, especially Scandina-
vian states, had, in the Advocate-General's words, adopted affirmative action schemes
"in order to guarantee . . . not equal opportunities but an equal share of jobs."'3 The
Advocate-General said that he thought he "must resist the temptation to follow the
trend" within the European Parliament and many Member States in favour of equali-
ty of result rather than equality of opportunity.
The interpretation and practice of certain European institutions and Member
States is opposed to the interpretations reached by the Court and Advocate-General.
Many criticise the judgment for this. Some suggest that the Advocate-General and
Court could have referred more fully to the Parliament's position and the schemes in
place in Member States, 7 presumably because they might have provided some sup-
port for the view that quotas and preferences are compatible with "equal opportunity"
rather than compelling equality of result.
Unless the Court was disposed to ignore the wording of the directive ("equal
opportunity" not "equal result") it is unlikely that reference to national practice would
have changed the Court's decision. If the directive had truly intended to permit equality
of result rather than equality of opportunity, the language chosen was singularly ill
adapted to convey that meaning. One can readily see that a proposal that mandated
equality of result based on the sole ground of sex would not have been proposed let
alone passed in 1976. Instead, promoting equal opportunity by measures intended to
ensure equality of starting points was proposed and readily accepted.
Furthermore, the Council's non-binding Recommendation on Positive Action for
Women,"8 which does not define "positive action," appears to be rather more consis-
tent with promoting equality of opportunity, than with measures coercing equal re-
sults.
69
63. Compare Missippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982), J.E.B. v. Alabama
ex. rel. T.B. 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994), and United States v. Virginia 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274
(1996), with Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
64. Compare Douglas-Scott, supra note 62 at 1587 n.16; Loenen and Veldman, supra note 11, at
49 n.16 with Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 190 (para. 26) (Opinion of Advocate-General).
66. Id. at 190 (para. 27).
67. OHare, supra note 38.
68. Council Recommendation 84/635/EEC on the Promotion of Positive Action for Women, 1984
O.J. (L 331) 34.
69. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 187 n.20 (Opinion of Advocate-General).
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The Influence of America: Is the Rehnquist Court to "Blame" for Kalancke?
The answer is clearly no. The influence of non-Community law upon the judg-
ment was minimal. The Court referred solely to general principles drawn from its own
case law. The Advocate-General drew upon American case law regarding the compat-
ibility of affirmative action with the constitutional protection of equal protection found
in the Fourteenth Amendment' but did not refer to the constitutional and legislative
positions of Member States on affirmative action. The Advocate-General and the
Court have been the subject of criticism suggesting they should have referred to devel-
opments in Member States. 1 This criticism is not a telling one. In deciding the case
upon general principles of its own case law the Court was surely on safe ground. If the
Advocate-General had restricted himself to the case law of the Court of Justice it is
unlikely that comment would have been made about his failure to refer to the various
laws of European nations. However, the part national law played in his opinion was
slight. The Advocate-General's invocation of American authority was restricted to a
single footnote. 2 Many more references are made by the Advocate-General to the
case law of the Court of Justice.
A Judgment in Shorthand
The brevity of the Court's judgment in Kalancke has been much criticised. The
Court's reasoning has been impugned as "minimal -- one might say non-existent""
and as "excel[ling] in ambiguity." 4 On the other hand, the Court's judgment has been
admitted by the same critics to be "a tenable conclusion"" and a "reasonable out-
come."76  While criticism of the Court's brief statement of reasons is both under-
standable and inevitable, the substance of its conclusions is far more difficult to im-
pugn. The Court reached the right conclusion in law and policy, which is to be pre-
ferred to its reaching the wrong conclusion with a full panoply of alleged supporting
justifications. Furthermore, the Court is free to develop its reasoning as to the contrast
between equality of opportunity and equality of result in greater depth in future cases,
and it is likely to do so. It will surely not have a shortage of such opportunities.
The Court's reasoning is indeed sparse and truncated in its presentation. The
judgment would have greatly enhanced its persuasive power had the Court's rationale
been elaborated in more detail. In addition, the brevity of' the judgment has resulted in
some ambiguity. The Court did not define in detail its concept of equal opportunity.
This is important because, while affirmative action's connection to equality of opportu-
nity and to equality of result is clear in theory, a study of the relevant literature reveals
that this connection is confused in practice. The Advocate-General's criticism of the
Court's condemnation of the creation of special rights for women may be such an
70. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 483 U.S. 265 (1978); United Steelworkers of
America v. Webster, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(cited in Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R at 182 n.10 (Opinion of Advocate-General)).
71. O'Hare, supra note 38.
72. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 182 n.10 (Opinion of Advocate-General).
73. Moore, supra note 41, at 158.
74. Peter Noorlander, Affirmative Action; Recent Developments, Internet url:
<http://www.ccc.nottingham.ac.uk/ -ilzweb/hrlc/hrnews/15-2-96/affacti.htm>.
75. Moore, supra note 41, at 161.




V. THE PRESENT STATE OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN EUROPEAN
LAW: WHAT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REMAINS PERMISSIBLE?
In addition to indicating what Article 2(4) does not permit, the Court makes
some general statements about what affirmative action measures are permitted by the
derogation in Article 2(4). That Article, said the Court, "allowed] measures which,
although discriminatory in appearance, are in fact intended to eliminate or reduce actu-
al instances of inequality which may exist in the reality of social life."77 It thus "per-
mits national measures relating to access to employment, including promotion, which
give a specific advantage to women with a view to improving their ability to compete
on the labour market and to pursue a career on an equal footing with men."7 Given
the vagueness of these statements, probably the best indication of what derogations
might be permitted comes from the Court's views of what is not permitted. The Court
has said that "absolute and unconditional priorit[ies] ... go beyond promoting equal
opportunities" and that a law may not substitute "for equality of opportunity as envis-
aged in Article 2(4) the result which is only to be arrived at by such equality of oppor-
tunity." Consequently, probably only "soft" affirmative action measures will be permit-
ted by this derogation from the individual right to non-discrimination.
Nonetheless, a number of suggestions have been made in Europe that "harder"
affirmative action measures may still be permissible. Two such views have been put
forward by the European Commission and the Government of the Netherlands.
The Commission's Views
The Commission interprets the Court's judgment to condemn the automatic na-
ture of the preference rather than the concept of preference itself.79 According to this
view, a number of measures which involve employment preference for women contin-
ue to be lawful following the judgment, though their clear purpose is equality of result
rather than equality of opportunity. One such measure promotes women by specifying
proportions for representation and time frames within which this should be achieved.
Such plans do not require that a woman be chosen in a particular decision. 0 Under
such a plan, equality of opportunity (promotion of the best applicant) is likely to take
second place to furthering compliance with the plan. Another such measure does im-
pose an "obligation of principle" for employers to recruit or promote on the basis of
sex but does not grant an individual right of gender preference.8' Once again, such
measures aim not at providing equality of appointment on the exclusive basis of job-
related characteristics but aim at creating equality of result by preferring one sex over
another. Similar comments may be made about state subsidies to employers recruiting
women in fields where they are "under-represented."' Such measures, as governmen-
tal rewards for equality of result rather than equality of opportunity, undermine the
non-discrimination principle. Such measures do not appear to pay sufficient heed to the
77. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 193-94 n.18 (citing Case 312/86, Commission v. France, 1988 E.C.R.
6315, 1 C.M.L.R. 408 (1989)).
78. Id. at 194 n.19.






Court's endorsing equality of opportunity and condemning measures which substitute
"the result which is only to be arrived at by providing such equality of opportunity."
3
The Court's definition of the scope of Article 2(4) similarly focuses on removing arbi-
trary barriers to employment and is consistent with equality of opportunity. The Court
stated that Article 2(4) permits "national measures relating to access to employment,
including promotion, which give a specific advantage to women with a view to im-
proving their ability to compete on the labour market and to pursue a career on an
equal footing with men."'" This is equality of starting points, not of result. Similarly,
the Advocate-General argued that Article 2(4) permitted equalising starting but not of
arrival points -- that is equality of opportunity in competing for employment but not
equality of result in such employment."
The View of the Netherlands Government
The view of the Netherlands Government (based on the practice of the Dutch
Equal Opportunities Commission"6 ) is that preferences remain permissible where the
proportion of women in a particular employment class or pay bracket is less than the
proportion of women in the relevant labour market.8 7 However, this view ignores the
fact that automatic preferences per se may have been by condemned the Court.
The Advocate-General's Suggestion
The Advocate-General suggested that Article 2(4) permitted "measures relating to
the organization of work, in particular working hours, and structures for small children
and other measures which will enable family and work commitments to be reconciled
with each other" to be conferred on the basis of sex.88 This suggestion appears to be
contrary to the Court's ruling in Commission v. France,89 where the Court had held
that the directive did not permit the creation of special rights for women, such as re-
duced working hours, leave allowance for children, and contribution towards the cost
of childcare, all allocated on the basis of sex. The Advocate-General suggested that
this ruling was one of "excessive severity." Such measures remain inconsistent with
the directive as long as the Court's decision stands.
VI. THE FUTURE OF EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN EUROPEAN LAW
European Lawyers Await a New Ruling
Many issues raised by the Kalancke judgment await clarification by the Court of
Justice. The pending proceedings in the Marschall case91 provide an opportunity for
the Court to clarify its approach. Marschall asks whether the directive is violated by an
affirmative action scheme similar to that of Bremen but subject to a qualification.
83. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 194 n.23.
84. Id. at 193-94 n.18.
85. Kalancke, at 186-87 n.19 (Opinion of Advocate-General).
86. The Dutch E.O.C. considers the Kalancke decision to be a confirmation of its policy. See
Loenen and Veldman, supra note 11, at 47.
87. Id.
88. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 186 n.18 (Opinion of Advocate-General).
89. Case 312/86, Commission v. France, 1988 E.C.R. 6315, 1 C.M.L.R. 408 (1989).
90. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 186 n.18 (Opinion of Advocate-General).
91. Case 490/95, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (1995).
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Preference will not be given to a woman where an equally qualified male candidate
would suffer an unbearable individual hardship.' In this case, defenders of the law
will argue that the preference is discretionary rather than automatic. In practice, how-
ever, it operates as a near-automatic preference. Proponents of preferences will thus
seek to do indirectly what they cannot do directly. The Court has yet to decide whether
something styled as a less than automatic preference is compatible with the directive.
Consequently, preferences may yet re-enter European law via the back door.
Calls for a Legislative Repudiation of Equality of Opportunity
In March 1996, the European Commission released a draft amendment of Article
2(4) seeking to entrench equality of result in European law. The following wording is
a proposed addition to that Article:
This directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal op-
portunity for men and women in particular by removing existing inequalities which
affect the opportunities of the under-represented sex.
Possible measures shall include the giving of preference, as regards access to
employment or promotion, to a member of the under-represented sex, provided that
such measures do not preclude the assessment of the particular circumstances of an
individual case.93
Such an amendment is consistent with equality of result but is in tension with the
expressed purpose of the directive to promote "equal opportunity" not "equal results."
A preference given on the basis of gender secures a predetermined result, not a genu-
ine competition directed towards choosing the best possible candidate. The prospects
that such an amendment could become law are not certain. Any amendment of the
directive must obtain unanimous assent from all fifteen Member States. The United
Kingdom, which intervened in the case in support of Mr. Kalancke, is unlikely to
support an amendment that weakens equality of opportunity.' To secure British
approval, the drafters of an amendment would probably have to consolidate the posi-
tion of equality of opportunity in European law. An amendment directed to mandatory
equality of result is most unlikely to obtain the assent of the current British Govern-
ment. Other Member States may be similarly reluctant. Support for the need to under-
mine or reverse the position taken by the Court of Justice is not overwhelming. Propo-
nents of equality of result thus find themselves in an impasse.
Others have proposed that the Maastricht Treaty should be revised to permit
employment measures consistent with equality of result and suggest a future Intergov-
ernmental Conference as an ideal opportunity to further this agenda.95 The fate of
such attempts to undermine equality of opportunity remains to be seen.
VII. CONCLUSION
In interpreting the "equal opportunity" of the Equal Treatment Directive as
92. O'Hare, supra note 38.
93. Affirmative action in the EC, BUS. LAW BRIEF, April 10, 1996, at 2.
94. Tom Buerkle, Europe's Court Strikes Down Hiring Quota for Women, IN'L HERALD TRM.,
October 18, 1995, at 1. See also, Alan Riley, Positive Discrimination and Practical Solutions, EUR.
CURRENT LAW, January 1996.
95. Loenen and Veldman, supra note 11, at 53; Social Policy: Experts Call for EU Treaty to
Address Equal Opportunities, EUR. REP., May 8, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8663568.
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equality of opportunity, the European Court of Justice has embraced the logical result
of the non-discrimination principle in employment: that, in accordance with European
and international law, sex and race are in general not relevant to suitability for em-
ployment. It has enhanced the operation of the non-discrimination principle in Europe
by maintaining that employment related decisions must be based on employment-relat-
ed criteria. This comes at a time when the non-discrimination principle had been seri-
ously eroded by legislative preferences on the basis of gender. The Court has rebuffed
attempts to preempt the result of equality of opportunity by prescribing equality of
result.
The Court refused to substitute for the directive's equality of opportunity "the
result [of] which is only to be arrived at by providing such equality of opportunity"9
at a time, however, when gender-based violations of equality of opportunity had se-
cured a place in the laws of many European nations. These violations of equality of
opportunity have now been denied a secure place in European law. Still, as proponents
of equal result seek to undermine the Kalancke judgment, equality of opportunity
stands under siege at the very moment when it has been vindicated by the Court of
Justice. European society, now more than ever, should support the principle of non-
discrimination by forbidding preferential treatment based on race or sex. Today's vic-
tims of such discrimination are not the oppressors of past discrimination, and should
not be punished as if they were. European society should follow the European Court's
lead and embrace equality of opportunity.
96. Kalancke, 1 C.M.L.R. at 194 n.23.
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